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Responsibility of International Organizations under
International Law for the Acts of Global Health Public-
Private Partnerships
Lisa Clarke*
Abstract
Public-private partnershjs governing global health are making progress in relation to the
prevention and treatment of diseases such as AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria. This progress
should not be underestimated as these partnerships are making strides above and beyond efforts
of either the public or private sector alone. As a consequence, partnershs are increasingy
exerdsing public power over global health in addition to, or instead of states and international
organirZations and are thus also becoming capable of adversely impacting the rghts of
individuals, in particular the rght to ife and the right to health. Responsibility under
international law therefore arises as an issue but, at the moment, partnershis are not directly
addressed by the rules of responsibility under international law. This Article describes global
health public-private partnershis and discusses how public power over global health is
increasingly being exercised by these partnershis thereby necessitating a further discussion on
responsibility under international law. It highlghts a gap in responsibility and suggests closing
this gap by holding international organizations, as partners and/ or hosts, responsible under
international law for the acts of these partnershs.
* Visiting Fellow (Lauterpacht Centre for International Law, University of Cambridge) and PhD
Candidate (Amsterdam Center for International Law, University of Amsterdam). This research is
conducted within the auspices of the VICI Project on The emerging internadonal consdtudonal order-
The implications of hierarrhy in international law for the coherence and legitimay of international decision-making.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Public-private partnerships, comprised of states and international
organizations (representing the public sector) and companies, non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), research institutes, and philanthropic foundations
(representing the private sector), are formi-ng as a response to the insufficiency
of the public or private sector alone in dealing with global health issues, such as
AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria.' As a result of this collaboration, there is a shift
taking place that moves (at least partly) power over global health from the hands
of states and international organizations into the hands of public-private
I See Gian Luca Burci, PubliclPivate Partnerships in the Public Health Sector, 6 Intl Orgs L Rev 359, 361
(2009) (describing public-private partnerships, in global health terms, as "long-term collaborative
arrangements among a group of diverse stakeholders, some of which of a public nature (e.g.
governmental agencies and intergovernmental organizations) and others of a private nature (e.g.
non-governmental organizations, private commercial companies, research institutes, professional
associations etc.) to jointly pursue a discreet public health goal"). See also UN Secretary-General,
Enhanced cooperation between the United Nations and all relevant partners, in particular the private sector Rep.
of the Secretagy-General, 8, UN Doe A/60/214 (Aug 10, 2005) (describing public-private
partnerships, in general terms, as "voluntary and collaborative relationships between various
parties, both State and non-State, in which all participants agree to work together to achieve a
common purpose or undertake a specific task and to share risks and responsibili ties, resources
and benefits").
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partnerships. These partnerships are managing activities that are normally
regarded as in the domain of states and international organizations, such as
providing access to preventative and treatment measures for certain diseases, or
improving health infrastructure within certain states to better manage the
growing risk of disease.
This shift to partnerships in the exercise of public power over global health
sparks novel discussions and raises fundamental questions of an international
legal nature about such partnerships. Among these novel discussions and
fundamental questions are those surrounding responsibility under international
law for the acts of public-private partnerships. If, for example, a public-private
partnership provides (or assists in providing) medication to a population that is
damaging to the health and life of the population because it is unsafe, not
properly tested, and/or expired, thereby infringing on the right to life and/or the
right to health, who is responsible under international law? Partnerships, by
intermingling partners from the public and private sector, reside outside the
classical, inter-state framework of international law and, in turn, outside the
framework of responsibility under international law. A gap is, therefore, created
between exercises of public power over global health by public-private
partnerships and responsibility under international law.
One way to address this gap might be to hold international organizations
responsible under international law for the acts of public-private partnerships.
International organizations are often uniquely situated as partners and/or hosts
in public-private partnerships. For example, in the cases of the Global Alliance
for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI) 2 and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS,
Tuberculosis and Malaria (The Global Fund),' the World Health Organization
(WHO) serves as a partner of the partnership. And in the cases of the Stop TB
Partnership (Stop TB) 4 and the Roll Back Malaria Partnership (RBM),s the
WHO serves as a partner and the host of the partnership. International
organizations, as partners and/or hosts, thereby enable public-private
partnerships to manage those activities that normally fall within the realm of
states and international organizations. If a partnership infringes on the right to
life and/or the right to health of a population, could the international
organization involved justifiably disassociate itself from responsibility under
2 Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization, online at http://www.gavialliance.org (visited
Apr 8, 2011) ("GAVI").
3 Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, online at
http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/ (visited Apr 8, 2011) ("The Global Fund").
4 Stop TB Partnership, online at http://www.stoptb.org/ (visited Apr 8, 2011) ("Stop TB").
s Roll Back Malaria Partnership, online at http://www.rbm.who.int/ (visited Apr 8, 2011)
("RBM").
Summer 2011
Clarke
57
Chicago Journal of International Law
international law? This Article suggests attributing the acts of partnerships to
international organizations through application of the International Law
Commission's (ILC) draft articles on the responsibility of international
6
organizations.
Another way to address this gap might be to hold states, as partners,
responsible under international law for the acts of public-private partnerships.
This might be done by attributing acts of public-private partnerships to states
through application of the Articles on the Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts (Articles on State Responsibility),7 specifically
Article 5 ("[c]onduct of persons or entities exercising elements of governmental
authority")8 and Article 8 ("[c]onduct directed or controlled by a State.") 9 This
suggestion has been discussed further by the author in a previous work and,
therefore, will not be explored here.1" Also, debates on the responsibility of non-
state actors such as companies and NGOs form a piece of the puzzle in the
discussion on the responsibility of public-private partnerships under
international law but, at the moment, these remain merely debates."
This Article begins, in Section II, by describing global health public-private
partnerships, specifically partnerships with which the WHO is associated,
including GAVI, the Global Fund, Stop TB, and RBM. The WHO is chosen as
the international organization of focus because of the proliferation of
partnerships involving the WHO. It acts as a partner and/or the host of an array
of partnerships and therefore its partnerships aptly illustrate the complex
relationship between partnerships and international organizations. The growing
popularity of public-private partnerships involving the WHO means, however,
that full coverage of all such partnerships is not practicable in a single article.
This Article therefore draws on GAVI, the Global Fund, Stop TB, and RBM as
examples because they are well-established public-private partnerships having an
impact on global health. The Article then proceeds, in Section III, to discuss
how public power over global health is increasingly being exercised by these
6 UN GAOR 64th Sess, Supp No 10 at 13-178, UN Doc A/64/10 (2009), online at
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/reports/2009/2009report.htm (visited Apr 8, 2011) ("Draft Articles").
7 United Nations General Assembly, Responsibikly of States for international# wrongful acts, UN Doc
A/RES/56/83 (2002) ("Articles on State Responsibility").
8 Id at Art 5.
9 Id at Art 8.
10 See Lisa Clarke, Global Health Pubic-Private Partnerships: Better Protecting Against Disease but Creating a
Gap in Responsibifi.y Under International Law, 20 Finnish Yrbk of Intl L (2009) (forthcoming July
2011).
11 See generally Philip Alston, ed, Non-State Actors and Human Rights (Oxford 2005); Anna-Karin
Lindblom, The Responsibikly of Other Entities: Non-Govemmental Oganigaions, in James Crawford,
Alain Pellet, and Simon Olleson, eds, The Law ofInternational Responsibiity 343 (Oxford 2010).
Vol. 12 No. 158
Responsibiliy of International OrganiZations
partnerships and how this necessarily engages a discussion on responsibility
under international law. Section IV then highlights the gap in responsibility in
relation to the acts of these partnerships and Section V suggests closing this gap
by holding international organizations, as partners and/or hosts, responsible
under international law for the acts of these partnerships. More specifically, it
considers attributing the acts of these partnerships to international organizations
through application of the draft articles on the responsibility of international
organzations.
II. GLOBAL HEALTH PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS
Partnerships between the public and private sector, in relation to global
health, have long existed, although in the beginning merely as donation
agreements between a recipient state and the donating entities. Over time,
partnerships have developed into highly integrated relationships among states,
international organizations, companies, NGOs, research institutes, and/or
philanthropic foundations. A short description of GAVI, the Global Fund, Stop
TB, and RBM now follows in order to provide a better picture of the activities
of global health public-private partnerships and to provide a background for the
subsequent sections discussing responsibility under international law.
A. GAVI
GAVI was established in 2000 under the auspices of the United Nations
Children's Fund (UNICEF). 12 After being hosted by UNICEF for almost a
decade, it became, in 2009, a foundation under Swiss law" and an independent
"international institution" with privileges and immunities in Switzerland in
accordance with the Federal Act on the Privileges, Immunities and Facilities and
the Financial Subsidies granted by Switzerland as a Host State (Host State Act).14
12 GAVI, GA17 recognised as an international institution (une 23, 2009), online at
http://www.gavialliance.org/media-Centre/press-releases/2009_06_23_swissfoundation.php
(visited Apr 8, 2011).
13 See GAVI, GA1I AIance Statutes, Art 1 (Oct 29-30, 2008), online at
http://www.gavialliance.org/resources/GAVIAlliance Statutes.pdf (visited Apr 8, 2011);
GAVI, GAVI Alliance Progress Report 2009, 44, 46, online at
http://www.gavialliance.org/resources/2009_GAVIAllianceProgressReport_2.pdf (visited
Apr 8, 2011).
14 GAVI, GA1I recognised as an international institution (cited in note 12); Switzerland Federal
Department of Foreign Affairs, Host State Bill (Feb 3, 2009), online at
http://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/home/topics/intorg/chres/reslaw.html (visited Jan 30, 2011);
FederalAct on the Privileges, Immunities and Facilities and the Financial Subsidies granted by Switqerland as a
Host State (une 22, 2007), online at
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GAVI aims to improve access to already existing vaccines, strengthen
health systems within states, and introduce new immunization technology." It
pursues these aims through innovative mechanisms such as an Advance Market
Commitment and the International Finance Facility for Immunisation. 6 The
partners of GAVI contribute by participating in strategy and policy setting,
advocating, fundraising, providing support to states, and developing, procuring
and delivering vaccines.17 GAVI's partners with representative membership and
voting rights on the GAVI Board include developing country governments,
donor governments, research and technical health institutes, the industrialized
country vaccine industry, the developing country vaccine industry, civil society
organizations, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, the WHO, UNICEF, and
the World Bank.' Private individuals serve as unaffiliated members with voting
rights on the Board." The Chief Executive Officer of the GAVI Secretariat
serves on the Board as a member without voting rights. 2 0
B. The Global Fund
The Global Fund was established in 2002 as a foundation under Swiss
law 2' and signed an Administrative Services Agreement with the WHO whereby
the WHO provided the Secretariat for the Global Fund.22 In 2004 it became
recognized as having "international juridical personality and legal capacity" with
http://www.eda.admin.ch/etc/medialib/downloads/edazen/topics/dipl/diplin.Par.0009.File.tmp
/Host%20State%20Act.pdf (visited Apr 8, 2011).
1s GAVI, Innovative partnersh, online at
http://www.gavialliance.org/about/in-partnership/index.php (visited Apr 8, 2011).
16 GAVI, Innovative Funding, online at http://www.gavialliance.org/about/in-finance/index.php
(visited Apr 8, 2011).
17 GAVI, Innovative partnership (cited in note 15).
18 GAVI, GA I/7 Aliance Board members, online at
http://www.gavialliance.org/about/governance/boards/members/index.php (visited Apr 8,
2011). The terminology used to describe the partners of GAVI is taken verbatim from the GAVI
website.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 See The Global Fund, By Laws, Art 1 (Mar 2, 2011), online at
http://www.theglobalfund.org/documents/core/Core GlobalFundBylaws.en.pdf (visited Apr
8,2011).
22 The Global Fund, Report of the Second Meeting of the Board, GF/B2/13 version 2, 38-39 (May 14,
2002), online at
http://www.theglobalfund.org/documents/board/02/SecondBoardMeetingReport.pdf (visited
Apr 8, 2011).
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privileges and immunities in Switzerland,2 3 and in 2006 it was designated a
"public international organization" with privileges and immunities in the US. 24
In 2009, it became administratively autonomous by terminating its
Administrative Services Agreement with the WHO.25
The Global Fund focuses on international health financing to support
programs in the prevention and treatment of AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria in
states with a low income and a high disease burden. It does not implement
programs directly but instead relies on other organizations on the ground for
local knowledge and technical assistance. 26 The partners of the Global Fund with
representative membership and voting rights on the Board include NGOs
representative of the communities living with the diseases, a developed country
NGO, a developing country NGO, developed countries, developing countries,
private foundations, and the private sector.27 The partners of the Global Fund
with ex oficio membership, but without voting rights on the Board, include the
Global Fund, Partners, the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
(UNAIDS), the WHO, the World Bank, and a Board-designated Swiss
member."
C. Stop TB
Stop TB was established in 2001, building upon the Stop TB Initiative
created under the auspices of the WHO in 1998.29 Its Secretariat is hosted by the
WHO, which means that it manages its administrative, financial, and human
resources matters according to the rules and regulations of the WHO, subject to
23 Agreement between the Swiss Federal Council and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malatia in
view of determining the legal status of the Global Fund in Swzerland (Dec 13, 2004), GF/B8/7, online at
http://www.theglobalfund.org/documents/board/08/gfb87_annex4a.pdf (visited Apr 8, 2011).
24 3 CFR 13395 (George W. Bush, Executive Order 13395 Designating the Global Fund To Fight AIDS,
Tuberculosis and Malaria as a Public International OrganiZation Entitled To Enjoy Certain Primileges,
Exemptions, and Immuniies).
25 The Global Fund, The Global Fund Becomes an Administrativey Autonomous Institution as of2009 (Dec
19, 2008), online at http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/pressreleases/?pr=pr_-081219 (visited Apr
8,2011).
26 The Global Fund, How the Global Fund Works, online at
http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/how/?ang=en (visited Apr 8, 2011).
27 The Global Fund, Board Members, online at
http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/board/members/?lang=en (visited Apr 8, 2011). The
terminology used to describe the partners of the Global Fund is taken verbatim from the Global
Fund website.
28 Id.
29 Stop TB, About Us, online at http://www.stoptb.org/about/ (visited Apr 8, 2011).
Summer 2011
Clarke
61
Chicago Journal of International Law
adaptations to meet the specific needs of Stop TB. 0 It is not an independent
partnership, as are GAVI and the Global Fund; rather, it is a partnership
operating in close association with an international organization-the WHO.
Stop TB does not have juridical personality and any privileges, and immunities
granted to Stop TB arise through its relationship with the WHO."
The goal of Stop TB is to eliminate tuberculosis as a global health
problem.3 2 It strives to do this by improving access to accurate diagnoses and
effective treatments; increasing the availability, affordability and quality of anti-
tuberculosis drugs; and promoting research and development for new
diagnostics and anti-tuberculosis drugs." The partners of Stop TB number over
a thousand and this number is not subject to a cap-partnership is open to any
organization committed to the measures necessary to eliminate tuberculosis as a
global health problem.34 Partners include international organizations, donors
from the public and private sectors, governmental organizations, NGOs,
academic/research institutions, and patient activist groups." The Stop TB Board
is, however, limited to thirty-four members representing the component
constituencies of the partnership including representatives from high burden
countries, the WHO, the World Bank, the Global Fund, an international
organization, regional areas, working group chairpersons, financial donors, a
foundation, NGOs and technical agencies, communities affected by
tuberculosis, the chair of the WHO Strategic and Technical Advisory Group,
and the corporate business sector. 6
30 Id.
31 Stop TB Partnership Secretariat, Basic Framework for the Global Partnershi to Stop TB, 13, online at
http://www.stoptb.org/assets/documents/about/STBBasicFramework.pdf (visited Apr 8, 2011);
Stop TB, Request for Proposals-Independent Evaluation of the Global Stop TB Partnership, 15 (Mar 20,
2007), online at
http://www.stoptb.org/assets/documents/news/announcements/RFP20Mar.pdf (visited Apr 8,
2011). There is no memorandum of understanding or other official document setting out the
relationship between Stop TB and the WHO.
32 Stop TB, About Us (cited in note 29).
33 Id.
3 Stop TB, Join the Partnershi, online at http://www.stoptb.org/getinvolved/joinus.asp (visited Feb
6,2011).
35 Stop TB, Welcome to the Stop TB Partnershi Partners' DirectoU, online at
http://www.stoptb.org/partners/ (visited Feb 6, 2011). The terminology used to describe the
partners of Stop TB is taken verbatim from the Stop TB website.
36 Stop TB, Coordinating Board, online at http://www.stoptb.org/about/cb/ (visited Feb 6, 2011).
The terminology used to describe the Board members of Stop TB is taken verbatim from the
Stop TB website.
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D. RBM
RBM was launched in 1998 by the WHO, UNICEF, United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP), and the World Bank.37 Its Secretariat is
hosted by the WHO, which means that the WHO provides administrative and
fiduciary support and facilities to the Secretariat, according to the rules and
regulations of the WHO, subject to adaptations to meet the specific needs of
RBM.3' Also, like Stop TB, it is not an independent partnership; rather it is a
partnership operating in close association with an international organization-
the WHO. RBM is not a separate legal entity, and any privileges and immunities
granted to RBM arise through its relationship with the WHO.
The aim of RBM is to free the world of malaria by supporting procurement
and supply management efforts for nets, insecticides, medicines, and diagnostics,
and improving access to affordable and effective anti-malarial medicines."0 RBM
has more than five hundred partners, including malaria endemic countries,
bilateral and multilateral development partners, the private sector, NGOs,
community-based organizations, foundations, and research and academic
institutions. 4 1 Any organization that abides by the strategies of RBM and
contributes to its implementation may join as a partner. 4 2 The Board, however,
has a more restrictive membership. It consists of twenty-one voting members
and four non-voting ex officio members. 43  The voting members include
representatives from malaria endemic countries, Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) donor countries, UNICEF, UNDP, the
WHO, the World Bank, research and academia, NGOs, private sector, and
37 RBM, RBM Mandate, online at http://www.rollbackmalaria.org/rbmmandate.htmi (visited Feb 6,
2011).
38 Memorandum of Understanding between the Roll Back Malaria Partnershp and the World Health Organation
Concerning Hosting, Secretariat and Administrative Services, Arts 2.1, 2.2 and 7 (Dec 15, 2006), online at
http://www.rollbackmalaria.org/docs/MoU.pdf (visited Apr 8, 2011).
39 Id at Arts 2.1 and 3.8.
40 RBM, RBM Vision, online at http://www.rollbackmalaria.org/rbmvision.htm (visited Apr 8,
2011); RBM, Malaria Commodity Access, online at http://www.rollbackmalaria.org/psm/index.htm
(visited Apr 8, 2011); RBM, The Affordable Medidnes Fadlity for Malaria (AMFm), online at
http://www.rollbackmalaria.org/psm/amfm.htm (visited Apr 8, 2011).
41 RBM, RBM Mandate (cited in note 37). The terminology used to describe the partners of RBM is
taken verbatim from the RBM website.
42 RBM, RBM Constituencies, online at
http://www.rollbackmalaria.org/mechanisms/constituencies.html (visited Apr 8, 2011).
43 RBM, RBM Partnershp Board, online at
http://www.rollbackmalaria.org/mechanisms/partnershipboard.html (visited Apr 8, 2011). The
terminology used to describe the Board members of RBM is taken verbatim from the RBM
website.
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foundations." The non-voting ex offido members include representatives from
the Global Fund, RBM, UNITAID, and the UN Secretary General Special
Envoy for Malaria.45
GAVI, the Global Fund, Stop TB, and RBM each has its own specific goal
and distinguishable organizational and governance structure. A significant
difference among these partnerships concerns the relationship each of these
partnerships has with the WHO. On one end of the spectrum, GAVI and the
Global Fund operate as independent international institutions and have the
WHO as a partner of the partnership. On the other end of the spectrum, Stop
TB and RBM operate under the auspices of the WHO and are dependent on the
WHO not only as a partner but also as the host of the partnership. These
varying relationships with the WHO are notable and are explored later when
discussing the responsibility under international law of international
organizations for the acts of public-private partnerships.4
Aside from these aforementioned differences, these partnerships also have
a commonality. These partnerships all exercise power over aspects of global
health, traditionally seen as in the domain of states and international
organizations. This Article now turns to this power and the ensuing concerns of
responsibility under international law.
III. POWER AND RESPONSIBILITY UNDER INTERNATIONAL
LAW
Power and responsibility under international law go hand in hand;
47
responsibility under international law is the "logical corollary" of power.
Responsibility under international law provides a means to deal with abuse of
power in the international community. As power over global health shifts from
states and international organizations to public-private partnerships,
responsibility under international law does not, however, follow. This section
describes the relationship between power and responsibility under international
law with respect to states and international organizations and then shows how
the power exercised by global health public-private partnerships also requires a
relationship with responsibility under international law.
44 Id.
45 id.
46 See Section V.
47 Philippe Sands and Pierre Klein, Bowett's Law ofInternadonal Institutions 518 (Sweet & Maxwell 6th
ed 2009). See International Law Association, Berlin Conference (2004), Accountabity ofInternadonal
Organigations, 1 Intl Orgs L Rev 221, 225 (2004) ("[A]s a matter of principle, accountability is
linked to the authority and power of an [international organization]. Power entails accountability,
that is the duty to account for its exercise.").
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Writing on the responsibility of states under international law in 1928,
Clyde Eagleton argued that "[p]ower breeds responsibility" and further argued
that "[a] state is increasingly willing to accept responsibility for actions within its
territories, if it has sufficient authority over such actions."" The rules on the
responsibility of states under international law, developed initially as customary
international law and later set out in the Articles on State Responsibility, arose
from the need to hold states responsible for an abuse of power resulting in an
act that was wrongful under international law. Even the critical look taken by
Philip Allott focused on power: "Instead of limiting the power of governments,
the ILC's version of state responsibility establishes the limits of their powers. It
affirms rather than constrains power." 49 State responsibility is, and always has
been, tied to the power of states.
The underlying logic of "power breeds responsibility" in relation to states
naturally made its way into the world of international organizations.so The
responsibility of international organizations, like state responsibility, is tied to
power. Power over global issues is now being governed by international
organizations, in addition to, or instead of, states. 1 This shift in power means
that international organizations are capable of acting in ways that impact the
"social, political, economic and legal status of individuals." 52 This impact was
not, in the beginning, recognized as troubling, since international organizations
were seen in a positive light. International organizations were thought to have "a
great role to play in the salvation of mankind" and to be incapable of doing
harm.5 ' But, as August Reinisch writes, it was precisely this shift in power that
opened up the possibility of rights violations by international organizations and
led to the question, quis custodiet ipsos custodes? (who guards the guardians?): "[It is
exactly the increased direct involvement of international organizations in aspects
of global governance through 'quasi' or immediate legislative, administrative, and
judicial tasks that has turned the tables and led to situations where international
organizations may violate fundamental rights of individuals." 5 4
48 Clyde Eagleton, The Responsibiklty of States in InternationalLaw 206 (New York University 1928).
49 Philip Allott, State Responsibiliy and the Unmaking ofInternationalLaw, 29 Harv Intl L J 1, 2 (1988).
50 See E. Paasivirta and P.J. Kuijper, Does One Site Fit All?: The European Community and the
Responsibikty ofInternational OTgani!ations, 36 Netherlands Yrbk of Intl L 169, 173 (2005).
51 See generally Christoph H. Schreuer, The Waning of the Sovereign State: Towards a New Paradigm for
InternationalLaw?, 4 EurJ Intl L 447 (1993).
52 Gerhard Hafner, Accountability of International Organi.ations-A Cridcal View, in Ronald St. John
MacDonald and Douglas M. Johnston, eds, Towards World Constitutionaism 585, 592-93, 629
(Nijhoff 2005).
5 Nagendra Singh, Termination ofMembership ofInternational Organisations vii (Praeger 1958).
54 August Reinisch, Securing the Accountability of International Organizations, 7 Global Governance 131,
132 (2001). See Robert McCorquodale, International OrganiZations and International Human Rights
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For example, a decision of the WHO to issue a travel ban to a state where
the outbreak of an infectious disease has occurred; a decision of the United
Nations Security Council to blacklist an individual suspected of terrorist
activities and subject him to sanctions; or a decision of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees as to a determination of refugee status are all
situations where international organizations are capable of having an adverse
impact on the rights of individuals. The power exercised by international
organizations thus necessitates responsibility. Rules on the responsibility of
international organizations developed as customary international law and are
now being set out by the ILC in the form of draft articles on the responsibility
of international organizations.ss
Over time, governance over global issues has further shifted from states
and international organizations to other entities such as public-private
partnerships. Partnerships are stepping in and performing tasks normally seen as
in the domain of states and international organizations. But this comes with
other possibly adverse consequences and it may, therefore, be necessary to
subject these partnerships to legal restraints in the form of responsibility under
international law.
In the area of global health, this shift in governance is seen through various
activities of public-private partnerships. GAVI, for example, aims to improve
access to already existing vaccines, strengthen health systems within states, and
introduce new immunization technology." As of August 2008, GAVI had
approved granting a total of US $3.7 billion to states for the period from 2000 to
2015.s The Global Fund is focused on international health financing to support
programs in the prevention and treatment of AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria in
states with a low income and a high disease burden.5 ' As of December 2010, the
Global Fund had approved grants totaling US $21.7 billion for 579 programs in
144 states. 9 Stop TB, with the goal of eliminating tuberculosis, strives to
improve access to accurate diagnosis and effective treatments; increase the
availability, affordability and quality of anti-tuberculosis drugs; and promote
Law: One Giant Leap for Humankind, in Kaiyan Homi Kaikobad and Michael Bohlander, eds,
International Law and Power Perspetives on Legal Order andJustice 141, 142 (Nijhoff 2009).
ss See Draft Articles (cited in note 6).
5 GAVI, Innovative partnership (cited in note 15).
57 GAVI, Approved Support, online at www.gavialliance.org/performance/commitments/index.php
(visited Apr 9, 2011).
58 The Global Fund, How the GlobalFund Works (cited in note 26).
5 The Global Fund, Porfolio and Grant Performance, online at
www.theglobalfund.org/en/performance/grantportfolio/?ang=en (visited Apr 9, 2011).
Vol. 12 No. 166
Responsibility of International OrganiZations
research and development for new diagnostics and anti-tuberculosis drugs.o
RBM, aiming to free the world of malaria, supports procurement and supply
management efforts for nets, insecticides, medicines, and diagnostics and
undertakes to improve access to affordable and effective anti-malarial
medicines.
GAVI, the Global Fund, Stop TB, and RBM, recognizing the insufficiency
of the public or private sector alone in addressing these growing health
concerns, are stepping in and filling, or partially filling, the shoes of states and
international organizations and, as a result, are exercising public power over
global health issues. This power is capable of adversely impacting the rights of
individuals, in particular the right to life and the right to health.62 Such power
necessitates legal restraints such as responsibility under international law. A gap
in responsibility under international law, however, arises when it comes to the
acts of global health public-private partnerships.
IV. THE GAP IN RESPONSIBILITY UNDER INTERNATIONAL
LAW
Partnerships are developing outside the classical, inter-state framework of
international law. This has its advantages, for example, in the flexibility of
partnerships to be able to initiate, amend, or terminate projects more easily than
states or international organizations.63 But this also has its disadvantages. One
disadvantage, especially from the perspective of individuals who might be
adversely impacted by the acts of public-private partnerships, is that partnerships
are developing outside the framework of responsibility under international law.
This section highlights and offers a rationale for the gap in responsibility under
international law arising from the acts of public-private partnerships. It leads to
consideration, in the subsequent section, of the responsibility of international
organizations for the acts of public-private partnerships.
Existence outside the framework of responsibility under international law
stems from the hybrid composition of public-private partnerships. Partnerships
60 Stop TB, About Us (cited in note 29).
61 RBM, RBM Vision (cited in note 40); RBM, Malaria Commodity Access (cited in note 40); RBM, The
Affordable Medidnes Fadcty for Malaria (AMFm) (cited in note 40).
62 See Section V.A.
63 Craig Wheeler and Seth Berkley, Initial lessons from pubc-private partnershp in drug and vaccine
development, 79 Bulletin of the World Health Organization 728, 731 (2001). See Eyal Benvenisti,
"Coaitions of the Wilring" and the Evolution of Informal International Law 16 (Tel Aviv University Law
Faculty Papers, Paper 31, 2006), online at
http://aw.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1031&context=taulwps (visited Apr 26,
2011).
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are composed of both public and private entities-states and international
organizations (representing the public sector) and companies, NGOs, research
institutes, and philanthropic foundations (representing the private sector). This
composition means that partnerships are neither purely public nor purely
private. It is, therefore, impossible to place them in either category exclusively.
The legal status of public-private partnerships under international law is, as a
result, unclear. Partnerships involve public entities, i.e. states and international
organizations, which have legal personality under international law, but also
involve private entities, i.e. companies, NGOs, research institutes, and
philanthropic foundations, which are not thought to have legal personality under
international law. Consequently, the legal personality of public-private
partnerships under international law is obscure.
A finding of legal personality under international law is imperative,
however, because responsibility under international law depends on legal
personality under international law: "[Legal personality] provides a means by
which an actor can be held responsible and/or liable under applicable laws,
based on its power, competence and functions. Only legal personality can have a
legal authority to exist in law and the means to remain accountable."64 Legal
personality brings not only rights but also duties. As famously stated by the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) in Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Senice of
the United Nations, legal personality means, for an actor, that "it is a subject of
international law and capable of possessing international rights and duties."" Or
in the words of Chittharanjan Felix Amerasinghe: "Once the existence of
64 Bimal N. Patel, The Accountabity of International Organizations: A Case Study of the Organisaion for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 13 Leiden J Intl L 571, 577 (2000).
65 Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1949 ICJ 174, 179
(Apr 11, 1949). See William E. Holder, International OrganiZaions: Accountabikly and Responsibiity,
American Society of International Law, Proceedings of the 97th Annual Meeting, 231, 231 (2003)
('With such personality, the organization is inducted into the international club, assumes
commensurate status, and takes on both rights and obligations."); McCorquodale, International
Organisations and International Human Rights Law at 151 (cited in note 54):
[A]s it is uniformly accepted that international organisations have international legal
personality, by which they participate in the international legal system, then they must have
international rights and responsibilities. Even if these international legal responsibilities are
not exactly the same as those of States, international organisations must have some legal
responsibilities arising from their participation in the international legal system.
United Nations Secretary-General, Financing of the United Nations Protection Force, the United Nations
Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia, the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force and the United
Nations Peace Forces headquarters-Administrative and budgetay aspects of the finandng of the United Nations
peacekeeping operations: financing of the United Naions peacekeeping operaions, 6, UN Doc A/51/389
(Sept 20, 1996) ("The international responsibility of the United Nations for the activities of
United Nations forces is an attribute of its international legal personality and its capacity to bear
international rights and obligations.").
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international personality for international organizations is conceded, it is not
difficult to infer that, just as organizations can demand responsibility of other
international persons because they have rights at international law, so they can
also be held responsible to other international persons because they have
obligations at international law."66
Absent legal personality under international law, responsibility under
international law is difficult to allocate. The legal personality of companies and
NGOs under international law, for example, is seen as lacking clarity and
therefore correlating rules on responsibility under international law are far from
determined.6 ' As the legal personality under international law of public-private
partnerships is open to question, holding them responsible under international
law is also open to question. It is useful, therefore, to turn to those partners
and/or hosts of partnerships possessing legal personality under international
law-states and international organizations-to determine whether or not these
partners and/or hosts could be held responsible under international law for the
acts of partnerships. The responsibility of states has been discussed elsewhere by
the author, 8 therefore the discussion here focuses on the responsibility of
international organizations.
V. THE RESPONSIBILITY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
Sixty years ago, Eagleton predicted the possible need to hold international
organizations responsible for their acts. Such a prediction was striking as it
departed from a state-centric perspective that saw responsibility as a concern
only between and amongst states. This prediction was supported by the
recognition of international organizations as legal persons under international
law, joining a once exclusive group comprised of states. Eagleton suggested that
"it seems reasonable to believe that the rules of the international law of
responsibility would apply, though perhaps with some variations, to any subject
of international law, and not merely to states."O Today, it has become less far-
fetched to imagine holding international organizations, as legal persons
exercising public power within the international community, responsible under
international law.
6 C.F. Amerasinghe, Prinales of the Institutional Law of International OganiZations 399 (Cambridge
2005).
67 See generally Alston, Non-State Actors and Human Rights (cited in note 11); Lindblom, The
Responsibi/ty of Other Enities (cited in note 11).
68 See Clarke, GlobalHealth Publc-Private Partnershios (cited in note 10).
69 See Clyde Eagleton, Internaional OrganiZaion and the Law of Responsibidly, 76 Recueil Des Cours 323
(1950).
70 Id at 325.
Summer 2011
Clarke
69
Chicago journal of International Law
Ideas about the responsibility of international organizations grew initially
from ideas about state responsibility. Eagleton suggested translating the notions
of state responsibility to the responsibility of international organizations. State
responsibility, he wrote in 1928, is "simply the principle which establishes an
obligation to make good any violation of international law producing injury,
committed by the respondent state."" Later, in 1950, he wrote "[t]hough it has
been stated only in terms of states, this law is properly applicable to all
international legal persons." 72 It is now conceded that the responsibility of
international organizations has developed as customary international law: "The
principle that [international organizations] may be held internationally
responsible for their acts is nowadays part of customary international law.",7 The
move to set out these rules more concretely came later through the ILC's draft
articles on the responsibility of international organizations.74
Since 2002, a Special Rapporteur, Giorgio Gaja, has been assigned by the
ILC to the topic of the responsibility of international organizations. To date, the
ILC has published a series of reports on this topic in consultation with
governments and international organizations.7 ' Although not yet completed, the
draft articles on the responsibility of international organizations are apt to
become the leading source determining the responsibility of international
organizations under international law.
Several other approaches have been taken or are now being taken (or at
least explored) by international bodies and scholars to deal with the increasing
power exercised by international organizations. Among them are the
International Law Association's work on the accountability of international
organizations, New York University's work on global administrative law, and the
Max Planck Institute's work on the public law approach. An important aspect of
these approaches is the focus on power. The International Law Association's
71 Eagleton, The Responsibiliy ofStates at 22 (cited in note 48).
72 Eagleton, 76 Recueil Des Cours at 324 (cited in note 69).
73 International Law Association, 1 Intl Orgs L Rev at 254 (cited in note 47).
74 See Draft Articles (cited in note 6).
75 Giorgio Gaja, First Report on the Responsibity of International OganiZations, Intl Law Commn, UN
Doc A/CN.4/532 (Mar 26, 2003); Giorgio Gaja, Second Report on the Responsibikly of International
Oganitadons, Intl Law Commn, UN Doc A/CN.4/541 (Apr 2, 2004); Giorgio Gaja, Third Report
on the Responsibifity of International Otganiations, Intl Law Commn, UN Doc A/CN.4/553 (May 13,
2005); Giorgio Gaja, Fourth Report on the Responsibilty ofInternational OrganiZations, Intl Law Commn,
UN Docs A/CN.4/564, A/CN.4/564/Add.1 and A/CN.4/564/Add.2 (Feb 28, 2006); Giorgio
Gaja, Ffth Report on the Responsibifi y of International OganiZations, Intl Law Commn, UN Doc
A/CN.4/583 (May 2, 2007); Giorgio Gaja, Sixth Report on the Responsibility of International
OqaniZaions, Ind Law Cornmn, UN Doc A/CN.4/597 (Apr 1, 2008); Giorgio Gaja, Seventh Report
on the Responsibiflty of Internadonal Oqanitadons, Intl Law Commn, UN Doc A/CN.4/610 (Mar 27,
2009).
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recommended rules and practices "are aimed at making accountability
operational by inter aka fostering the effectiveness and appropriateness of the use
of power and sanctioning the abuse or derailment of power.""7 Global
administrative law argues that "the increasing exercise of public power ... has
given rise to senous concerns about legitimacy and accountability"" and
suggests dealing with these concerns by meeting "adequate standards of
transparency, participation, reasoned decision, and legality, and by providing
effective review of [] rules and decisions."7 The public law approach focuses on
the exercise of international public authority, which includes "any kind of
governance activity by international institutions ... f it determines individuals,
private associations, enterprises, states, or other public institutions." It is based
on a combination of the constitutional, administrative, and international
institutional law approaches to global governance.8"
This Article will not delve into these approaches. Accountability is a
"highly contested and indeterminate concept" and "usually signifies a broad set
of 'control mechanisms', including but not limited to legal ones"" and global
administrative law and the public law approach are still developing and not yet
authoritative. Responsibility of international organizations under international
law, on the other hand, is a more clearly defined and developed legal approach
76 International Law Association, New Delhi Conference (2002), Committee on Accountability of
International Organisations, Third Report Consolidated, Revised and En/arged Version of Recommended
Rules and Practices 2 (2002) ("RRP-S"), online at http://www.ila-
hq.org/downIload.cfm/docid/D585222D-6DBB-429B-A3CF98463CC63979 (visited Feb 7,
2011). See International Law Association, Res No 1/2004, Accountability ofInternational Organisations
(Aug 16-21, 2004), online at http://www.ila-hq.org/download.cfm/docid/6A3BA30F-1059-
4339-8ED758712F578772 (visited Feb 7, 2011) (recommending that "the Committee on the
Accountability of International Organisations, having achieved its mandate, be dissolved, without
prejudice to whatever other arrangements the Executive Council sees fit to make in order to
follow, and contribute to, the continuing work of the International Law Commission on the
Responsibility of International Organisations").
77 Nico Krisch and Benedict Kingsbury, Introduction: Global Governance and GlobalAdministraive Law in
the International Legal Order, 17 Eur J Intl L 1, 1-2 (2006).
78 Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch, and Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence of Global Administrative
Law, 68 L & Contemp Probs 15, 17 (Summer-Autumn 2005). See Burci, 6 Intl Orgs L Rev (cited
in note 1).
79 Armin von Bogdandy, Philipp Dann and Matthias Goldmann, Developing the Publicness of Pubc
International Law: Towards a Legal Framework for Global Governance Activiies, 9 German L J 1375,
1376-77 (2008).
s0 Id.
81 August Reinisch, Accountabilty of International OrganiZationsAccording to National Law, 36 Netherlands
Yrbk Intl L 119, 121-22 (2005). See August Reinisch, Governance Without Accountabilyo?, 44
German Yrbk Intl L 270, 273-74 (2001); Hafner, Accountabilty of International OrganiZations at 599
(cited in note 52).
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to deal with the internationally wrongful acts of international organizations. 82
This Article therefore focuses on the ILC's work on the draft articles on the
responsibility of international otganizations to determine whether international
organizations could be held responsible under international law for the acts of
public-private partnerships.
The draft articles on the responsibility of international organizations "apply
to the international responsibility of an international organization for an act that
is wrongful under international law." 83 International organization is defined here
as "an organization established by a treaty or other instrument governed by
international law and possessing its own international legal personality.
International organizations may include as members, in addition to States, other
entities."8
The responsibility of international organizations is based on the same
mantra as the responsibility of states, which is that "[e]very internationally
wrongful act ... entails ... international responsibility."" Further, the elements
of an internationally wrongful act of an international organization are in line with
those of a state: a breach of an international obligation of an international
organization and attributability to that international organization under
international law. The following subsections consider these two elements in the
context of particular global health public-private partnerships-GAVI, the
Global Fund, Stop TB, and RBM-and an international organization with which
they are associated, the WHO.
A. Breach of an International Obligation
One of the two elements of an internationally wrongful act of an
international organization is that it constitutes a breach of an international
obligation of that international organization. A breach of an international
obligation occurs "when an act of that international organization is not in
conformity with what is required of it by that obligation, regardless of its origin
and character."" An international obligation, according to the draft articles on
the responsibility of international organizations and the commentary of the ILC,
82 Reinisch, 36 Netherlands Yrbk Intl L at 121 (cited in note 81). See Hafner, Accountability of
International OrganiZations at 601 (cited in note 52).
83 Draft Articles at Art 1(1) (cited in note 6).
8 Id at Art 2(a).
85 Id at Art 3. See Articles on State Responsibility at Art 1 (cited in note 7).
86 Draft Articles at Art 4 (cited in note 6). See Articles on State Responsibility at Art 2 (cited in note
7).
87 Draft Articles at Art 9(1) (cited in note 6).
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"may arise under the rules of the [international] organization"88 or "may be
established by a customary rule of international law, by a treaty or by a general
principle applicable within the international legal order.",8  This subsection
begins by setting out the international obligations of international organizations,
focusing in particular on the WHO, and subsequently, it explores the possibility
of a breach of such international obligations through the acts of certain global
health public-private partnerships.
The ICJ opines in Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the
WHO and Egypt that "[i]nternational organizations are subjects of international
law and, as such, are bound by any obligations incumbent upon them under
general rules of international law, under their constitutions or under
international agreements to which they are parties."90 This opinion is widely
accepted by scholars. Reinisch writes that "[t]he relevant constituent agreements
of international organizations, as well as other treaty law and customary
international law, form the 'proper law of international organizations."' 9' Also,
Gerhard Hafner submits that "[t]he treaty law of [international organizations]
can no longer be seen as the sole legal basis of their activities so that recourse
must be made to customary international law or general principles of law." 92 But
by what specific obligations under international law are international
organizations bound? In particular, and in relation to the WHO, where do
human rights obligations under international law, such as those arising from the
right to life and the right to health, fit within the schema?
The WHO is not a party to treaties protecting the right to life or the right
to health and therefore this possible source of obligations need not be explored.
Another possible source of obligations, in relation to the right to life and the
right to health, is customary international law. In order for this source to hold
sway, the right to life and/or the right to health must be norms of customary
international law. This is determined by locating consistent state practice and
88 Id at Art 9(2).
89 Id at 77, quoting Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assemby, UN Doc
A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2) (2001) at 55.
90 Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egvpt, Advisory Opinion, 1980
ICJ 73, 89-90 (Dec 20, 1980).
91 Reinisch, 7 Global Governance at 133 (cited in note 54), quoting C. Wilfred Jenks, The Proper Law
ofInternaional Organitiaons (Oceana 1962).
92 Hafner, Accountabikty of Internaional OrganiZaions at 629 (cited in note 52). See Reinisch, 44
German Yrbk Intl L at 281-82 (cited in note 81); Sands and Klein, Bowett's Law of International
Institutions at 461-65 (cited in note 47); Henry G. Schermers and Niels M. Blokker, International
Institutional Law: Unity Within Diversity 833-35, 994-1002 (Nijhoff 2003).
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opinio juris." Proof of state practice and opinio juris, in relation to human
rights, may be found by looking to: (1) diplomatic correspondence; (2) opinions
and policy statements of governments; (3) press releases; (4) statements made by
governments at international conferences and meetings of international
organizations; (5) resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations;
(6) the acceptance of and adherence to human rights treaties; (7) domestic
legislation; (8) judicial decisions of domestic courts; (9) states' reports to treaty
bodies of the United Nations; (10) the Human Rights Council Universal
Periodic Review process; and (11) the work of domestic human rights
organizations.9 4
It is difficult to discern when a norm has crystallized into customary
international law.95 A thorough inquiry into the customary international law
status of the right to life and the right to health is therefore not feasible to
include here; however, a few remarks must be made. The right to life is often
said to have customary status under international law.96 This, however, tends to
be where the right to life is interpreted as protecting against arbitrary killing.
There is a growing consensus, however, that the right to life protects against
more than arbitrary killing. The Human Rights Committee has stated that "the
right to life has been too often narrowly interpreted" and that it not only
requires that states adopt negative measures but that it is "desirable for States
parties to take all possible measures to reduce infant mortality and to increase
life expectancy, especially in adopting measures to eliminate malnutrition and
93 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany/ Denmark; Federal Republic of
Germany/Netherlands), 1969 ICJ 177 (Feb 20, 1969).
94 See Christine Chinkin, Sources, in Daniel Moeckli, et al, eds, International Human Rights Law 103, 111
(Oxford 2010); Olivier De Schutter, International Human Rights Law-Cases Materials, Commentary
50-51 (Cambridge 2010); Ian Brownlie, Princaples of Public International Law 6-7 (Oxford 7th ed
2008).
9s Christian Tomuschat, Human Rights: Between Ideaksm and Realism 37-38 (Oxford 2008); Chinkin,
Sources at 111-12 (cited in note 94). See De Schutter, InternationalHuman Rights Law at 52-53 (cited
in note 94) (providing a summary of some of the different approaches to discerning customary
international law).
96 See Nigel S. Rodley, Integrity of the Person, in Moeckli, et al, eds, International Human Rights Law 209,
221-22 (cited in note 94); Tomuschat, Human Rights at 37 (cited in note 95); Hansje Plagman, The
Status of the Right to Life and the Prvbibiion of Torture Under International Law: Its Implications for the
United States, J Inst Just Intl Studies 172, 177 (2003); Hurst Hannum, The Status of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights in National and International Law, 25 Ga J Intl & Comp L 287, 343
(1995/1996); B.G. Ramcharan, The Concept and Dimensions of the Right to Life, in B.G. Ramcharan,
ed, The Right to Life in International Law 1, 3 (Nijhoff 1985); Haluk A. Kabaalioglu, The Obhgations to
'Respect' and to Ensure' the Right to Life, in Ramcharan, ed, The Right to Life in International Law 160,
161; Yoram Dinstein, The Right to Life, Physical Integrity, and Liberty, in Louis Henkin, ed, The
International Bill of Rights: the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 114, 115 (Columbia 1981); Las
Palmeras v Colombia, Preliminary Objections, Inter-Am. CtHR 67 ser C Separate Opinion of Judge
A.A. Cangado Trindade 15 (Feb 4, 2000).
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epidemics." 97 It is this interpretation of the right to life that is of interest here.
Arguing that this interpretation has status under customary international law,
however, has its challenges. If the right to life includes taking all possible
measures to reduce infant mortality and to increase life expectancy then the door
is likely left open for states to decide how to implement these measures. If states
are given such leeway then it may become difficult to locate the consistent state
practice and opinio juris needed for the formation of customary international
law. This is not to say that customary international law will not move, or is not
already moving, in this direction. But given that this interpretation of the right to
life is relatively recent, the requisite state practice and opinio juris do not yet
exist.
The status of the right to health under customary international law is even
more questionable. There are scholars who argue that the right to health is
developing, or has already developed, into a norm of customary international
law. 8 The right to health is, however, generally seen as amorphous in its
standards, thereby obstructing the consistent state practice and opinio juris
necessary for the creation of customary international law. This does not preclude
the possibility of the right to health developing into a norm of customary
international law in the future, and there are signs of this development in
relation to certain aspects of the right to health, but the consensus is that this
day has not yet arrived.9
97 United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, General Comment No 06: The
rght to lfe (Art 6), 5 (Apr 30, 1982) online at
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/84ab9690cd81fc7cl 2563ed0046fae3 (visited Feb 8,
2011). See Bertrand Mathieu, The Right to Life 95, 98 (Council of Europe 2006); Alicia Ely Yamin,
Notfust a Tragedy: Access to Medications as a Right under International Law, 21 BU Intl L J 325, 330-31
(2003); Ramcharan, The Concept and Dimensions of the Right to Life at 8-10 (cited in note 96); F.
Menghistu, The Satisfaction of Sunival Requirements, in Ramcharan, ed, The Right to Life in International
Law 63, 64, 80-81 (cited in note 96); Juan Humberto Sdnche. v Honduras, Inter-Am CtHR 99 ser C
110 (June 7, 2003); Villagrin Morales et al v Guatemala, The "Street Children" Case, Inter-Am Ct
HR 63 ser C 144 (Nov 19, 1999); Association X v the United Kingdom, App No 7154/75, 14 Eur
Commn HR Dec & Rep 31, 32 (1978). But see Dinstein, The Right to Life at 115-16 (cited in note
96).
98 See Eleanor D. Kinney, The International Human Rght to Health: What Does This Mean for Our Nation
and World?, 34 Ind L Rev 1457, 1464-67 (2001); Patrick L. Wojahn, A Conflict of Rights: Intellectual
Property under TRIPS, The Right to Health, and AIDS Drugs, 6 UCLA J Intl L & Foreign Aff 463,
494-96 (2001-2002); Jonathan Wike, The Marlboro Man in Asia: U.S. Tobacco and Human Rights, 29
Vand J Transnad L 329, 354-57 (1996); Beth Gammie, Human Rights Impiaions of the Export of
Banned Pesticides, 25 Seton Hall L Rev 558, 590 (1994).
9 David P. Fidler, "Geographical Morality" Revisited: International Relations, International Law, and the
Controvery over Placebo-Controlled HIV Clinical Trials in Developing Countries, 42 Harv Intl L J 299, 348
(2001); Lawrence 0. Gostin and Lance Gable, The Human Rights of Persons aith Mental Disabilities: A
Global Perspective on the Appication of Human Rghts Priniles to Mental Health, 63 Md L Rev 20, 109
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The more likely source of human rights obligations under international law
for the WHO, at least in relation to the right to life and the right to health, is the
rules of the WHO itself. As mentioned above, an international obligation of an
international organization "may arise under the rules of the [international]
organization."'" Rules are defined in the draft articles on the responsibility of
international organizations as "the constituent instruments, decisions,
resolutions and other acts of the organization adopted in accordance with those
instruments, and established practice of the organization."'o' The rules of the
WHO thus include: the Constitution of the World Health Organization,' 02 which
sets out the objective and functions of the WHO; decisions of the WHO,
resolutions of the World Health Assembly and other acts of the WHO adopted
in accordance with its instruments; and the established practice of the WHO.
Since the objective of the WHO is "the attainment by all peoples of the highest
possible level of health,"' the rules of the WHO focus on the lives and health
of people. Moreover, by associating itself with global health public-private
partnerships that work towards preventing and treating life-threatening diseases
such as AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria, the WHO is making a commitment, at
minimum, to avoid situations harmful to those people it is trying to help. If the
rules of the WHO bring with them commitments in relation to the lives and
health of people and if, according to the draft articles on the responsibility of
international organizations, international obligations of the WHO arise under
the rules of the WHO, then it is reasonable to conclude that the WHO has
obligations in relation to the right to life and the right to health.
After having set out the international obligations of the WHO, the
possibility of a breach of such international obligations by the WHO through
the acts of global health public-private partnerships now needs to be explored.
A breach of an international obligation by the partnerships used as
examples throughout this Article-GAVI, the Global Fund, Stop TB, and
RBM-has not yet been recorded. But the possibility of such a breach is real. It
is useful here to draw an analogy between these partnerships and international
organizations. International organizations were, in the beginning, thought of as
incapable of doing harm.'" Capability to do harm was however foreseen by
Eagleton. In 1950, he wrote about the possibility of a breach of an international
(2004); Rhianna M. Fronapfel, AIDS Prevention and the Right to Health under International Law: Burma
as the Hard Case, 15 Pac Rim L & Pol J 169, 191-94 (2006).
100 Draft Articles at Art 9(2) (cited in note 6) (emphasis added).
101 Id at Art 2(b).
102 Constitution ofthe World Health OrganiZaion, 45th ed, Supplement (Oct 2006).
103 Id at Art 1.
104 See Singh, Termination ofMembersho ofInternaional Organisations at vii (cited in note 53).
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obligation by the United Nations and its ensuing responsibility under
international law even though no such breach had been recorded necessitating
recourse to responsibility under international law. His idea was that, as powers
were being readily transferred to the United Nations, the United Nations was
becoming increasingly capable of doing harm and therefore responsibility under
international law needed to be addressed. In the absence of recorded breaches of
international obligations, he suggested scenarios where the United Nations
might be found in breach of international obligations and then proceeded to
address responsibility under international law.'os The same reasoning may be
applied, admittedly to a different degree, to global health public-private
partnerships. Partnerships are changing the face of global health and the lives of
millions. But as partnerships exercise public power over global health, they
become increasingly capable of doing harm' 6 and therefore responsibility under
international law needs to be addressed. A few scenarios illustrate how a breach
of an international obligation might arise through the acts of global health
public-private partnerships.
GAVI, as of September 2010, approved for purchase two pneumococcal
vaccines from two major pharmaceutical companies, Pfizer and
GlaxoSmithKline, to immunize infants and young children in developing
states. 07 These companies committed to supply 600 million doses at a fraction
of the price charged to developed states.'"0 The Global Fund, as of July 2010,
finalized agreements with six manufacturers to provide malaria drugs at an
affordable price in eight countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia.o' Stop TB
reported in May 2010 that the Global Drug Facility, managed by the Stop TB
Secretariat, will oversee the donation from the Novartis Foundation for
105 Eagleton, 76 Recueil Des Cours at 385-404 (cited in note 69). See Paasivirta and Kuijper, 36
Netherlands Yrbk of Intl L at 173 (cited in note 50) (transposing Eagleton's "power breeds
responsibility" from Eagleton, The Responsibiiy of States at 206 (cited in note 48) to international
organizations).
106 See Burci, 6 Intl Orgs L Rev at 379 (cited in note 1) ("[Public-private partnerships] engaged in
activities, such as financing research and development or procurement of new medicines ... can
generate non-contractual liability.").
107 GAVI, PfiZer vaccine receives AMC approval by Independent Assessment Committee (Sept 10, 2010), online
at http://www.gavialliance.org/media-centre/pressreleases/pfizer-amcapproval.php (visited
Apr 10, 2011).
108 Id.
109 The Global Fund, Agreements Reduce Prices of Malaria Medidnes by up to 80% (July 14, 2010), online at
http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/pressreleases/?pr=pr_100714 (visited Apr 10, 2011). See also
Amir Attaran, et al, WHO, the Global Fund, and me&cal mapractice in malaria treatment, 363 The
Lancet 237 (Jan 17, 2004); Vinand M. Nantulya and Jon Liden, Response to accusations of medical
malractice by WHO and the Global Fund, 363 The Lancet 397 (Jan 31, 2004) (taken from Davinia
Abdul Aziz, Privileges and Immunities of Global Pubc-Private Partnershtos: A Case Study of the Global
Fund to FightAIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, 6 Intl Orgs L Rev 383, 386 (2009)).
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Sustainable Development of 250 thousand tuberculosis treatments in
Tanzania." 0 RBM procures the supply of long-lasting insecticidal mosquito nets
and also insecticides and spraying equipment to protect against malaria."'
Notwithstanding precautionary measures, a possibility exists that the
pneumococcal vaccines approved for purchase by GAVI, the malaria drugs
provided through the Global Fund, the tuberculosis treatments overseen by
Stop TB's Global Drug Facility or the nets, insecticides, and spraying equipment
procured by RBM are unsafe and, as a result, damaging to the health and life of a
population, thereby infringing on the right to life and the right to health.
As a breach of an international obligation through the acts of global health
public-private partnerships has been demonstrated to be a real possibility, the
discussion moves to attributability to an international organization.
B. Attribution
The other element of an internationally wrongful act of an international
organization is attributability to an international organization under international
law. Attributability is dealt with in draft Article 5 of the draft articles on the
responsibility of international organizations. 112 According to draft Article 5(1),
"[t]he conduct of an organ or agent of an international organization in the
performance of functions of that organ or agent shall be considered as an act of
that organization under international law whatever position the organ or agent
holds in respect of the organization."" 3 Draft Article 5(2) further provides that
"[r]ules of the organization shall apply to the determination of the functions of
its organs and agents."' 4
110 Stop TB, Novartis donates 250 000 TB treatments to the Stop TB Partnershp (May 19, 2010), online at
http://www.stoptb.org/news/stories/2010/ns10_028.asp (visited Apr 10, 2011). See Stop TB,
What is the GDF?, online at http://www.stoptb.org/gdf/whatis/default.asp (visited Apr 10, 2011).
111 RBM, Malaria Commodity Access (cited in note 40); RBM, Procurement: Long lasting insecticidal mosquito
nets (LLNS or LNs), online at http://www.rollbackmalaria.org/psm/procurementLLINs.html
(visited Apr 10, 2011); RBM, Procurement: Insecticides and spraying equipment for Indoor Residual Spraing
online at http://www.rollbackmalaria.org/psm/procurementRS.html (visited Apr 10, 2011).
112 See Draft Articles at Art 5 (cited in note 6).
113 Id at Art 5(1) (cited in note 6). See Diference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special
Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion, 1999 ICJ 62, 88-89 (Apr 29, 1999)
("[D]amages incurred as a result of acts performed by the United Nations or by its agents acting
in their official capacity. The United Nations may be required to bear responsibility for the
damage arising from such acts."); Draft Articles at 60 (cited in note 6) ("What was said by the
International Court of Justice with regard to the United Nations applies more generally to
international organizations, most of which act through their organs (whether so defined or not)
and a variety of agents to which the carrying out of the organization's functions is entrusted.").
114 Draft Articles at Art 5(2) (cited in note 6).
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The question analyzed in this subsection is whether a public-private
partnership (specifically GAVI, the Global Fund, Stop TB, or RBM) may be
considered an "agent" of an international organization (specifically the WHO)
such that the conduct of the former can be considered an act of, or attributed to,
the latter under international law.
"Agent" is defined in draft Article 2 to include "officials and other persons
or entities through whom the organization acts.""' Further, relying on the
commentary on the Articles on State Responsibility, which states that attribution
does not depend on the use of particular terminology in the internal law of the
state,116 the ILC adopts an analogous rationale for the draft articles on the
responsibility of international organizations."' An agent of an international
organization may be found regardless of the label given to it by the international
organization. The sweeping definition in draft Article 2 along with the
commentary of the ILC on the draft articles on the responsibility of
international organizations as to the meaning of the term indicates that formal
status of the person or entity is not determinative; what is determinative is
whether the person or entity has been conferred functions by the international
organization."' The ICJ, in Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United
Nations, stated:
The Court understands the word "agent" in the most liberal sense, that is to
say, any person who, whether a paid official or not, and whether
permanently employed or not, has been charged by an organ of the
Organization with carrying out, or helping to carry out, one of its
functions-in short, any person through whom it acts." 9
Applying this understanding of the term agent to GAVI, the Global Fund, Stop
TB, and RBM and an international organization with which they are
associated-the WHO-produces varying results depending on the partnership
under scrutiny.
The phrase "charged by an organ of the Organization with carrying out, or
helping to carry out, one of its functions"'120 must be considered more closely. The
functions of interest here are those of the WHO and these are set out in Article 2
of the Constitution of the World Health Organization.12 1 Of particular interest in
115 Id at Art 2.
116 Report of the International Law Commission, at 40-42 (cited in note 89).
117 Draft Articles at 58 (cited in note 6).
118 Id at 58-60.
119 Reparation for Injuries, at 177 (cited in note 65) (dealing with the issue of whether the United
Nations had the capacity to bring a claim in the case of injury caused to one of its agents).
120 Id (emphasis added).
121 Constitution of the Wor/d Health OrganiZation at Art 2 (cited in note 102).
Summer 2011
Clarke
79
Chicago Journal of International Law
the context of global health public-private partnerships are the following
functions:
(c) to assist Governments, upon request, in strengthening health services;
(d) to furnish appropriate technical assistance and, in emergencies, necessary
aid upon the request or acceptance of Governments; ...
(f) to establish and maintain such administrative and technical services as
may be required, including epidemiological and statistical services;
(g) to stimulate and advance work to eradicate epidemic, endemic and other
diseases; ...
(j) to promote co-operation among scientific and professional groups which
contribute to the advancement of health; ...
(n) to promote and conduct research in the field of health; ...
(q) to provide information, counsel and assistance in the field of health.122
GAVI, the Global Fund, Stop TB, and RBM carry out one or more functions of
the WHO, especially: strengthening health services in states, providing
administrative and technical support, working towards eradicating diseases,
promoting cooperation among actors focused on health, and encouraging and
facilitating research in the area of health.
Next, it is necessary to consider whether the WHO has chared these
functions to these partnerships. This can be determined by scrutinizing the
relationship between the WHO and GAVI, the Global Fund, Stop TB, and
RBM. Before turning to these relationships, it needs to be determined whether
functions must be charged in a formal sense or whether functions may be
charged on a less formal or de facto basis. This relates to draft Article 5(2)-
"[r]ules of the organization shall apply to the determination of the functions of
its organs and agents."1 23 The ILC has interpreted this to mean that the
functions charged to an agent of an international organization are generally
determined by the rules of the international organization.124 But, according to
the ILC, the wording used in draft Article 5(2) is also intended to leave open the
possibility that, in exceptional circumstances, functions may be considered as
charged to an agent of an international organization even if not based on the
rules of the international organization.125 One such other basis, cited by the ILC,
is when persons or entities are acting on the instructions of or under the
direction or control of the international organization.126 It is, therefore, plausible
122 Id.
123 Draft Articles at Art 5(2) (cited in note 6).
124 Id at 61.
125 Id.
126 Gaja, Seventh Report on the Responsibity of Internaional OrganiZations at j 22 (cited in note 75); Draft
Articles at 61-62 (cited in note 6). See Pierre Klein, The Atribuion of Acts to International
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that functions may be considered as charged to an agent of an international
organization on a less formal or de facto basis. As Pierre Klein writes, "it is
nonetheless important to look beyond situations of formal links, and to take into
account the actual relations of the individuals (or groups of individuals) with an
international organization in any given situation."1 27
In GAVI, the WHO is a founding and key partner of the partnership.1 28 It
is a member, with voting rights, of the GAVI Board and chairs this Board in
alternation with UNICEF.129 GAVI also depends on the WHO for technical
advice in framing its policies.'" Further, the WHO helps states in their
application for funds and also in the implementation and monitoring of
immunization activities."' In the Global Fund, the WHO is also a key partner of
the partnership. It is an ex officio member, without voting rights, of the Global
Fund Board. 132 At its establishment, the Global Fund signed an Administrative
Services Agreement with the WHO whereby the WHO provided the Secretariat
and administrative and financial services for the Global Fund.'3 3 But this
Administrative Services Agreement was terminated in January 2009 and the
Global Fund now manages its own Secretariat and administrative and financial
services.'" The Global Fund relies on the WHO for technical expertise to the
Secretariat, Country Coordinating Mechanisms, and potential Principal
Recipients."'3 The WHO also helps states prepare applications for funding and
carry out the programs and reach the targets set out in the funding
agreements. 36
The relationships of GAVI and the Global Fund with the WHO are ones
of partnership. The WHO is a key partner in both partnerships with
Organi.aions, in Crawford, et al, eds, The Law ofIntemational Responsibity 297, 298 (cited in note 11)
("[A]n organ or an agent may or may not be connected to the organization by formal organic ties,
and, in the latter case, acts may be attributed to the organization if the entity or person is under
the control of the organization.").
127 Klein, The Attribution ofActs to International OrganiZations at 299 (cited in note 126).
12 GAVI, The World Health Organiaion (WHO), online at
http://www.gavialliance.org/about/in.partnership/who/index.php (visited Apr 10, 2011).
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 The Global Fund, Board Members (cited in note 27).
133 The Global Fund, The Global Fund becomes an Administrative# Autonomous Institution (cited in note
25).
134 Id.
135 The Global Fund, Development Partners, online at
http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/developmentpartners/?1ang=en (visited Apr 10, 2011).
136 Id.
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membership on the Board and influence through the policies it supports. The
WHO supports the work of these partnerships in carrying out functions
normally seen as functions of the WHO. These functions of the WHO do not
seem to be charged to GAVI or the Global Fund in a formal sense. It may be
argued, however, that GAVI and the Global Fund are acting on the instructions
of or under the direction or control of the WHO and consequently, its functions
are being charged to these partnerships on a less formal or defacto basis. This is a
difficult argument to make and may stretch the responsibility of international
organizations too far. But it is worth thoughtful consideration given the effect of
these partnerships on global health and the gap in responsibility under
international law in relation to the acts of these partnerships.
Stop TB and RBM, however, have a different relationship with the WHO.
In Stop TB, the WHO is both a partner and the host of the partnership. As a
partner, it is the founding and a key partner of the partnership. It is a member of
the Stop TB Board providing guidance on policy in relation to tuberculosis.' 37
As the host, it houses the Stop TB Secretariat. This means that the Stop TB
Secretariat follows the rules and regulations of the WHO when managing
administrative, financial, and human resources matters, subject to adaptations to
meet the specific needs of Stop TB. 138 The WHO enters into contracts, acquires
and disposes of property, and, if necessary, institutes legal proceedings for the
benefit of Stop TB.'39 All staff of Stop TB are officials of the WHO and, as
such, are accorded privileges and immunities.'" In RBM, the WHO is also both
a partner and the host of the partnership. As a partner, it is a founding and key
partner of the partnership.' 4 ' It is a member of the RBM Board providing
guidance on malaria policy.'4 2 As the host, it houses the RBM Secretariat and
also provides administrative and fiduciary support and facilities.143 The
operations of the RBM Secretariat are carried out in accordance with the WHO
Constitution and other rules, regulations, policies, procedures, and practices of
the WHO, subject to adaptations to meet the specific needs of RBM.'" The
Director-General of the WHO further has the power to refuse to implement a
decision of RBM if he considers that implementation would be inconsistent with
the rules, regulations, policies, procedures, or practices of the WHO or could
"3 Stop TB, About Us (cited in note 29).
138 Id.
1 Stop TB, Basic Framework at 13 (cited in note 31).
140 Stop TB, Request for Proposals at 15 (cited in note 31).
141 Memorandum of Understanding at Preamble (cited in note 38).
142 Id at Art 1.3.
143 Id at Art 2.1.
144 Id at Arts 2.2, 7.
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give rise to liability for the WHO. 145 The WHO enters into contracts, acquires
and disposes of property, and, if necessary, institutes legal proceedings for the
benefit of RBM.w' All staff of the RBM Secretariat are staff members of the
WHO and the privileges and immunities enjoyed by the WHO and its staff also
apply to the RBM Secretariat staff, funds, properties, and assets.147
The relationships of Stop TB and RBM with the WHO are different than
the relationships of GAVI and the Global Fund with the WHO. This is due to
the fact that the WHO is not only a key partner of Stop TB and RBM with
membership on the Board and influence through the policies it supports but is
also the host of these partnerships. The hosting relationship means that the
WHO houses the Secretariat, provides rules and regulations, renders
administrative and financial support, hires staff, extends privileges and
immunities of the WHO to such staff, signs legal documents, and deals with
other legal matters of these partnerships. It is not easy to tell whether the
functions of the WHO have been charged to Stop TB and RBM in a formal
sense. But it is clear that the WHO is highly integrated in and supports the work
of these partnerships in carrying out functions normally seen as functions of the
WHO. The relationships of Stop TB and RBM with the WHO provide
compelling support for the argument that these partnerships are acting on the
instructions of or under the direction or control of the WHO. As a result, the
functions of the WHO are possibly being charged in a formal sense, but are, at
least, being charged on a less formal or defacto basis to these partnerships. It is
therefore conceivable that Stop TB and RBM are agents of the WHO.
This examination of the relationships between the WHO and GAVI, the
Global Fund, Stop TB, and RBM sheds light on whether the WHO has charged
its functions to these partnerships, making them agents of this international
organization. If such agency is found, it satisfies the other element of an
internationally wrongful act of an international organization-attributability to
an international organization under international law. A generalization cannot,
however, be made, because each of these partnerships has a different
relationship with the WHO. But there are similarities between GAVI and the
Global Fund and between Stop TB and RBM. In GAVI and the Global Fund,
the WHO acts as a partner and in Stop TB and RBM, the WHO acts as a
partner and the host. The distinction between acting as a partner versus acting as
a partner and the host has consequences for the determination of agency and, in
turn, attribution. A stronger case for agency and, in turn, for attribution lies
where the international organization acts as a partner and the host of the
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partnership as opposed to where the international organization acts only as a
partner of the partnership. But, in either case, arguments may be made, to
varying strengths, that GAVI, the Global Fund, Stop TB, and RBM are agents
of the WHO and that the acts of these partnerships may be attributed to this
international organization leaving this international organization responsible
under international law.
VI. CONCLUSION
Public-private partnerships are important players in the response to global
health issues such as AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria. But as these partnerships
increasingly exercise public power over global health, they also become
increasingly capable of adversely impacting the rights of individuals, such as the
right to life and the right to health. These partnerships, therefore, need to be
embedded within a framework of responsibility under international law. The fact
that the legal personality of partnerships under international law is open to
question, however, means that partnerships are not capable of being found
responsible under international law. To address this gap in responsibility under
international law, this Article suggested turning to international organizations
who act as partners and/or hosts of these partnerships. It considered attributing
the acts of partnerships, GAVI, the Global Fund, Stop TB, and RBM, to an
international organization, the WHO, through application of the draft articles on
the responsibility of international organizations. Such application would require
applying these draft articles in ways not foreseen by its drafters and an argument
may be made that this application stretches the responsibility of international
organizations too far. But where international organizations act not only as
partners but also as hosts of partnerships, the responsibility of international
organizations is not stretched that far. A possibility, therefore, lies to invoke the
draft articles on the responsibility of international organizations in relation to the
acts of global health public-private partnerships and thereby helps to meet the
challenges posed by the changing and expanding actors in the international
community.
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